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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In response to Ms. Edmonson’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
allowing Sergeant Ogaard to identify her as the person in a series of screenshots taken during the
burglary at issue in this case, the State makes two assertions worth addressing on reply. First, the
State claims that Ms. Edmonson made a false factual representation regarding the length of
Sergeant Ogaard’s interrogation of Ms. Edmonson.

Second, the State posits that whether

Ms. Edmonson’s appearance changed between the time of the burglary and the trial goes to the
weight of his identification, not to its admissibility. The first assertion is both dubious and
irrelevant, while the second is flatly incorrect. Because the district court abused its discretion by
allowing Sergeant Ogaard to identify Ms. Edmonson, this Court should vacate her conviction
and remand her case for a new trial.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Sergeant Ogaard to testify that
Ms. Edmonson was the woman in the screenshots taken during the burglary?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Sergeant Ogaard To Testify That
Ms. Edmonson Was The Woman In The Screenshots Taken During The Burglary

First, the State claims that Ms. Edmonson made,
the false factual assertion that the interview lasted 17 minutes. (Appellant’s brief,
p.8; see also Id. at p.2.) Although Exhibit 4 is 17 minutes and a few seconds long,
it also contains several redactions. (State’s Exhibit 4.) Thus the length of the
edited video, with portions of the interview redacted, does not reflect the true time
of the interview.
(Resp. Br., p.7 n.1.) Because the exact length of the interview is not clear from the record, the
State’s assertion that Ms. Edmonson’s representation was “false” is incorrect. Undersigned
counsel acknowledges having relied on the length of the interrogation video admitted at trial, and
overlooked that the video was redacted as the State points out.

(See Tr., p.170, Ls.2–6;

Tr., p.178, L.25–p.179, L.7. State’s Ex. 4.) However, the length of the redactions is not reflected
in the record (see, e.g., Tr., p.178, L.25–p.179, L.7 (the parties discussing that only one section
of the video was deleted), and the only other evidence regarding the length of the interrogation
was Sergeant Ogaard’s testimony that, to his “recollection,” it “was probably between—
anywhere between 20 to 30 minutes. There was a break in between, so that might be off a little
bit.”

(Tr., p.168, Ls.16–18; see App. Br., p.8 (citing that testimony).)

More importantly,

regardless of whether the interrogation lasted seventeen or thirty minutes, Sergeant Ogaard was
barely more familiar with Ms. Edmonson than was the jury. (See App. Br., p.8.) Therefore, he
was in no better position that the jury to determine whether the woman in the photo was
Ms. Edmonson or her sister.
Second, the State asserts that, “although there was no direct evidence Edmonson had
changed her appearance such a factor went to weight.” (Resp. Br., p.8.) The State fails to cite
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any authority for that proposition (see Resp. Br., p.8), but is presumably referencing a section of
State v. Barnes, 147 Idaho 587 (Ct. App. 2009), in which the Court of Appeals reviewed the
applicable standards from other jurisdictions (see Resp. Br., pp.6–7). When discussing the
“familiarity factor,” not the factor regarding changes in a defendant’s appearance, Barnes
explained:

“Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit ‘conclude[d] that the extent of a witness’s

opportunity to observe the defendant goes to the weight of the testimony, not to its
admissibility.” Id. at 594 (quoting United States v. Beck, 418 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005))
(alteration in original). The Barnes Court later analyzed the applicable factors as applied to the
witnesses’ identification of Barnes:
As noted, an additional factor which may be considered in the determination of
whether the testimony would be helpful to the jury is whether there were changes
in the appearance of the defendant at the time of trial. In this case, there was
testimony that by the time of trial Barnes’ appearance had changed in that he had
lost weight and had a different haircut. Barnes argues that the witness should
have indicated how Barnes’ hair was different and the extent of his weight loss.
However, these arguments go to the weight of the testimony. The district court
determined that the identification testimony would be helpful to the jury and
properly considered the changes in Barnes’ appearance in making that
determination.
Id. at 595 (emphasis added). Therefore, Barnes clearly states that a relevant consideration is
whether the defendant’s appearance had changed. Id.; see also State v. Salazar, 153 Idaho 24, 26
(Ct. App. 2012) (“A second factor is whether the defendant’s appearance has changed since the
date the image was taken.”).

Importantly, there was testimony at Barnes’ trial that his

appearance had in fact changed, and thus the Barnes Court’s reference to “the weight of the
testimony” addressed Barnes’ argument that the challenged witness in particular should have
discussed his changed appearance. See id. Therefore, the State’s claim here that, “although
there was no direct evidence Edmonson had changed her appearance such a factor went to
weight,” is incorrect.

(Resp. Br., p.8.) The district court abused its discretion by allowing
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Sergeant Ogaard to identify Ms. Edmonson as the person in the screenshots, and so this Court
should vacate her conviction and remand her case for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate Ms. Edmonson’s judgment of conviction and remand this case
for a new trial.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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